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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal of a final summary judgment in a civil case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the lower court err in holding that a party cannot as a matter of law es-

tablish possession of the property in support of an adverse possession claim if he leases
the property to a tenant? This issue was preserved at R. 6549-6564. "Summary judgment is only appropriate when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Thus, summary judgment
involves only legal conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no deference
to the trial court." Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2.

Did the lower court err in failing to grant summary judgment in favor of

David and Inez Allred on their adverse possession claim? This issue was preserved at
R. 4307-4332 and R. 6549-6564. Like the first issue, this issue is reviewed for correctness under the summary judgment standard.
3.

Did the lower court err in concluding that David and Inez Allred's causes

of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and
punitive damages are barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel and
the "special circumstances exception" did not bar the Allred Trusts' statute of limitations
defense? This issue was preserved below at R. 5402-5471, and is reviewed for correctness. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996).

RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession of
landlord.
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any
persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy,
or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years
from the time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant
may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to
his landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the periods herein
limited.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, Utah, dismissing plaintiffs' claims for 1) adverse possession,
2) breach of fiduciary duty, 3) fraud, 4) constructive trust, 5) punitive damages, and
6) declaratory judgment. R. 8159-8164. The facts are stated in the light most favorable
to the appellants. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d
1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) ("The trial court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility"
in a summary judgment).
In 1982 and 1983, Richard G. Allred induced his parents, David and Inez Allred,
to sign two quitclaim deeds transferring a developed parcel of commercial property located in Provo, Utah (the "Property") to nine trusts in favor of Richard, his brother
Stephen, their wives, and their children. R. 2894-2896. Richard told David and Inez that
the transfer was to help David and Inez save on taxes and that they would still beneficially own the property. R. 2894-2896. When David and Inez finished paying off the
mortgages and attempted to donate the property to their church, however, Richard would
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not comply with his parents' request to return record title so they could do so. R. 19341935, 2892-2895, 4326-4327.
The Property has been leased to and occupied by Qwest Corporation since 1974
under written lease agreements which identify David and Inez as the landlords. R. 44684508. Until mid-2000, Qwest paid the rent to David and Inez. R. 1901-1924,4322-4324,
4393-4395, 4523-4524. Soon after filing the Complaint in 2001, Qwest and David and
Inez jointly moved for the interpleader of Qwest's rental payments. R. 536. The lower
court denied the motion on October 2, 2001. R. 1207-1208. The court reasoned:
The documents provided by Richard Allred demonstrate that the
property leased by QWEST is owned by the trusts, David and Inez Allred
having conveyed it to the trusts in 1982. Though plaintiffs assert that they
have a colorable claim to the lease rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face
of the documents provided by the parties the property is owned by the trusts
and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts. R. 1207.
Later, on the eve of trial, the Allred Trusts moved in limine to preclude David and
Inez from relying on Qwest's tenancy to support David and Inez's adverse possession
claim, arguing that the decision on the interpleader motion had conclusively resolved the
issue of title to the property. R. 6328-6338. The lower court held that David and Inez
could not rely on Qwest's possession under the lease to demonstrate adverse possession,
and entered summary judgment against them on their adverse possession claim. R. 80818085, 8169:78-81. The lower court also held that its prior interpleader ruling was the law
of the case as to the issue of ownership of the Property. R. 8082. In addition, the lower
court issued a seven-page summary judgment ruling in which the court made findings of
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fact and determined as a matter of law that the statute of limitations had run on David and
Inez's remaining claims. R. 5907-10.
David and Inez Allred were an elderly husband and wife who, at the time this action was filed, were both over ninety years old. R. 8171:8. David passed away on December 3, 2001. R. 2225-2229. David and Inez have four children: Richard Gordon Allred, Mary Allred Jensen, Stephen James Allred, and Sylvia Allred Whitney. R. 8171:8.
Richard Allred is David and Inez's eldest son. R. 8171:79. He is an attorney licensed to practice in Utah and California, and first began to practice in 1976. R. 03280329. Richard is the trustee of eight of the nine Allred Trusts and Mary Lee Allred,
Richard's wife, is the trustee of the ninth trust. R. 103, 1690-1701. From at least 1976
through 1997, Richard acted as David and Inez's attorney and tax advisor. R. 92-102,
4394-4395. During the years 1983 through 1997, when Richard prepared David and
Inez's tax returns he signed them as "Paid Preparer" (except on one occasion he crossed
out the "paid" portion of this designation) and indicated instead that he was signing as
"attorney at law." R. 4553-4729. Richard also represented David and Inez in at least two
real property transactions: (1) a purchase of property in Logan, Utah, R. 91, 99, and
(2) the 1980 building addition constructed for Qwest on the Property, R. 87-88.
David and Inez acquired the Property in 1973, and leased it to Qwest in 1974. R.
2008-2030. Qwest has occupied the Property pursuant to lease from 1974 to the present.
R. 4468-4508. The property is fully developed, has several buildings on it, and is fully
fenced. R. 2008-2030, 8181 :Ex. 136 (map and parcel descriptions). David and Inez initially encumbered the property with a single mortgage, and in 1980 obtained a second
-4-

mortgage to construct additional improvements at Qwest's request. R. 2892-2893, 2899.
Both mortgage loans had been repaid by 1988. R. 4523-4524.
In 1982, Richard approached David and Inez and presented a plan he claimed
would ease some of their tax burden. R. 2894-2895, 8171:37-38. Richard proposed that
David and Inez convey the Property to trusts for the benefit of himself and his brother
Stephen. R. 2894-2895. He represented to David and Inez that the property would still
be theirs. R. 2894-2895, 8171:37-46. Richard prepared two quitclaim deeds and nine
trust agreements and, under the pretense of tax savings, persuaded David and Inez to execute the quitclaim deeds and trust agreements in late 1982 and early 1983. R. 2894-2895,
8171:37-46. In signing the deeds, David and Inez Allred never intended to relinquish
beneficial title to the Property and the transfer was to have been for tax purposes only. R.
2894-2895,8171:46.
Indeed, for the next 10 years David and Inez retained ownership and control, just
as Richard had promised. R. 4394-4398. They remained liable for, and continued to
make payments on, the mortgages until the mortgages were paid. R. 4438-4439, 44514453, 4462. David and Inez executed lease amendments with Qwest in 1987, 1994, and
1999. R. 1992-1993, 1995-1998. Each lease amendment was negotiated by David Allred
(except in 1999 when David's son-in-law, Gordon Jensen, negotiated the lease on behalf
of David and Inez) and each was executed by David and Inez Allred. R. 4397, 44684508.
Each of the leases identified David and Inez Allred as the "Owner." R. 4397,
4468-4508. Between 1974 and June 2000, David and Inez discharged all duties of the
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"Owner" under the terms of the leases. R. 4392-4399. They paid all real property taxes
and special assessments. R. 4392-4399. They responded to requests for information
from Qwest, including Form 1099 tax information, and they handled requests from Qwest
to alter the property.1 From 1973 to June 2000, David and Inez were responsible for all
communications with Qwest regarding the Property and the lease. R. 2989-3026, 44014464.
The leases were "net" leases, meaning that Qwest was obligated for the payment
of the real property taxes as part of the rent obligation. R. 2027. From 1974 to 1987,
David and Inez paid the property taxes and obtained reimbursement from Qwest.
R. 4401-4464. In 1987, David negotiated a lease modification so that David and Inez
sent the property tax notices to Qwest who then paid the taxes directly and sent David
and Inez verification of payment. R. 1992-1993. Between 1988 and 1998, this procedure
was followed except in 1999 when the tax notice was delayed and David and Inez Allred
paid the tax directly and obtained reimbursement from Qwest. R. 1990, 4395-4396. The
delay occurred because the property tax notice was sent to Richard's address and Richard
failed to timely deliver the tax notice to David and Inez. R. 8171:29, 4395-4396, 44024404.

1

A listing of the records documenting these events is found as follows: leases, R. 44684508; lease modification regarding property tax payment, R. 1992-93; documents demonstrating actions concerning property, R. 4401-4464; tax returns, R. 4553-4729; bank records regarding income, R. 1901-1924; and lease payments made to David and Inez,
R. 4523-4524.
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At all times between 1974 and June 2000, David and Inez controlled and received
all rent payments for the Property. R. 4393-4395. During this time period David and
Inez (i) received the rent directly, or (ii) caused the rent to be paid directly on Property
mortgages, or (iii) caused the rent to be directly deposited into bank accounts established
by David and Inez Allred and to which David and Inez Allred were signatories. R. 43934395. As of 1988, David and Inez directed Qwest to deposit all rent payments due under
the lease to David and Inez's Zions First National Bank accounts. R. 4393-4395.
In approximately 1991, nearly ten years after the deeds were recorded and after the
mortgages on the Property had been satisfied, David and Inez decided to make a charitable donation of the Property to their church. R. 8171:65-66. It was understandable that
David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds since they had continued to deal with the
Property in every respect as owners since the deeds had been recorded. R. 4401-4464.
Upon being made aware that record title was in the Allred Trusts, David and Inez immediately requested that Richard and Mary Lee reconvey record title to them as the rightful
owners. R. 2894-2895. Richard was evasive and non-committal. R. 2891-2892. He
eventually refused, maintaining that he owed a fiduciary duty to the Allred Trusts' beneficiaries2, R. 8170:111, R. 3022-3023, and, not coincidentally, that he objected to David
and Inez's intention to donate the Property to their church, R. 8171:68-69.
David and Inez implored Richard to return the Property. R. 4336-4348. Parents
seldom are willing to believe that their children will betray or manipulate them. Rich-

2

The beneficiaries were Richard and Mary Lee and their children; and Stephen Allred,
his now former wife, and their children.
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ard's parents sent him several letters about the Property. R. 4336-4348. Remarkably,
Richard claims to have never responded to the letters in writing. R. 2989. In one of the
letters, David and Inez described the circumstances under which they signed the deeds:
You will recall that when you left California [in June 1976] and
came to Bountiful you looked at my income tax statement and remarked
that I was paying far more income tax than was necessary and from that
time to the present you have been kind enough to make out my tax statement. To reduce the amount of taxes you had me sign certain papers, and
because of my great confidence in you and your ability, that whenever you
placed something in front of me to sign, I just signed it without reading the
document. Imagine my surprise that later I was told that you had the title to
our Provo property. I could not believe such.
I went to the Recorder's office in Provo and obtained a copy of the
title to the property as set forth in two quitclaim deeds, the first, #32615,
dated December 30, 1982, and the second #3531, dated January 3, 1983.
Inez recalls signing one copy which you placed before me, which I remember she did with much protest, but she does not recall signing a second one.
I recall signing a document you shoved before me, but I was informed it
was a way to save on taxes, so I signed it without reading it or knowing to
what extent I was then signing. Neither of us remember signing before a
Notary Public, but for you in our library room, with the thought I guess that
you would have two different Notary Public people, Barbara somebody and
a Maxine Beard acknowledge later on the statement that the people signing
were your parents. There was a day Richard, you will recall[,] when I had
explicit confidence in you and would sign whatever was placed in front of
me to sign. R. 4342.
The resulting family turmoil is obvious. One of the beneficiaries of the Allred Trusts,
Stephen J. Allred, Richard G. Allred's brother, sent a letter to Richard, with a copy to
David and Inez, renouncing any interest in the Property. R. 1893-94.
Understandably, in the letters David and Inez asserted their belief that they owned
the Property and that they intended to do whatever they lawfully could to recover title. R.
4339, 4344. David and Inez said they would sue to recover title and issued various
ultimatums and deadlines to Richard. R. 4340-4341. Hope springs eternal, especially in
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matums and deadlines to Richard. R. 4340-4341. Hope springs eternal, especially in the
hearts of parents, and although deadlines passed the parents did not take the threatened
actions. David and Inez's continued hopes that Richard would return the Property were
premised on deliberate conduct by Richard and his family. R. 2891-2897. In spite of the
failure to reconvey, assertions of fiduciary duty, and the certain knowledge that the parents considered themselves the owners of the property, Richard did nothing to stop David
and Inez from collecting and spending the rents as they wished. R. 4393. Also, Richard
and Mary Lee took other actions which encouraged the parents to believe that the family
could resolve matters privately. R. 2891-2897.
Long after the deadline concerning the Property, Richard prepared and signed
David and Inez Alfred's tax returns. R. 1957, 1965, 1975, 1981. Those tax returns reported that all of the rental income from Qwest and the Property belonged to David and
Inez. R. 1937-1982. From 1994 through 1997, Richard prepared David and Inez's income tax returns, which reported all of the income and expenses from the Property as belonging to David and Inez. R. 1937-1982. During that time, Richard not only did not
challenge David and Inez's ownership of the Property or their right to receive all income
from the Property, he acted as their tax advisor and attorney and acknowledged that they
were the rightful income recipients as the owners of the property. R. 1937-1982.
David and Inez were also encouraged that the family could resolve things privately
because their personal and confidential relationship with Richard did not change. R.
2989, 5502-5503, 5511-5513. Not only did Richard continue to prepare their tax returns,
he and his family continued to assist with the care of their home. R. 113-114. According
-9-

to Richard, he and his children were often at David and Inez's home doing chores, repairing cars, repairing the home, mowing the lawn, and shoveling snow, among many other
things. R. 113-114, 2710-2711. Richard considered that he continued to have a "reasonably close relationship" with his parents. R. 113-114. Mary Lee Allred likewise testified that Richard maintained his relationship with his parents which she characterized as
follows:
Q.
How would you characterize your husband's relationship with
his father after his father began making demands for return of the Provo
property?
A.

I would describe my husband's relationship as long suffering.

Q.

Help me understand what you mean by your choice of words.

A.
Even though his father was insistent that he sign the paper on
every single meeting when Richard went to the family home to visit his
parents, he would come away angry, but he would still return to do all of
their little fix it things around the home. And we used to wonder why he
would do that. R. 2989.
From 1991 forward, David and Inez would demand Richard return title to the
Property almost every time they saw him. R. 2989. Richard deliberately limited visits
with his parents to avoid discussion of the subject. R. 2891. When his parents would ask
to talk about the return of the Property, Richard employed methods to evade their requests, such as claiming he was too busy, that he had to get back to California, but promising that he would make time to talk about it the next time he was in town. R. 28912892.
Given David and Inez's continued control of the Property, use of the rents, and
other involvement with Richard and his family, it is understandable that they continued to
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believe it was possible to resolve things within the family. David and Inez continued to
act as owners and perform all actions of owners in every way. R. 4394. They continued
to receive all rents, continued to pay any expenses, continued to deal exclusively with
Qwest, negotiated and signed lease amendments with Qwest in 1994 and 1999 without
interference or input from the Allred Trusts, and continued to assert to the world that they
owned the Property. R. 4393-4397. The Allred Trusts did nothing to assert any claim inconsistent with David and Inez's actions and declarations.
For example, the Allred Trusts admit that prior to the year 2000, the trusts never
wrote out a check for or paid the property taxes or assessments on the Property, R. 30143015, 4518-4521, never had a bank account of any kind, R. 3003-3004, 3013, 4518-4521,
never filed for or received a tax identification number, R. 3003-3004, 4518-4521, never
filed a tax return claiming ownership of the rents generated by the Property, R. 2991,
4518-4521, had little or no information concerning the management, control, or leasing
arrangements with Qwest, R. 2990-2991, 3021. They also admit that Mary Lee Allred, as
beneficiary, never received any income from the Mary Lee Allred Trust, R. 3003-3004,
never received any income as trustee for the Richard G. Allred Trust from the Property,
R. 3003-3004, and, as trustee of the Richard G. Allred Trust, never incurred any expenses
R. 3003-3004.
The Allred Trusts were also unable to produce any records in this action other than
the nine trusts, two quitclaim deeds, and nine letters David and Inez had sent Richard
over the years. R. 1872-1878, 2990-2994, 3006-3007. The Allred Trusts were unable to
produce any records of management, control, or documents indicating ownership such as
-11-

leases, tax notices, or bank records. R. 1872-1878. David and Inez Allred, however,
produced hundreds of documents concerning their historic and continuous control, maintenance, and management of the Property from 1974 to August 2000. R. 3006-3007,
3041-3046, 4401-4464.

Moreover, in all of the 310 documents produced by Qwest, not

one document prior to the year 2000 contains any reference to Richard G. Allred, Mary
Lee Allred, or to any trust. R. 2933, 3288, 1897. The Allred Trusts have supplied no
documents whatsoever showing any activities or dealings by the Allred Trusts with respect to the Property between 1983 and June 2000. R. 2933, 3288, 1897.
Based on the confidential and fiduciary relationship that Richard encouraged with
his aging parents between 1991 and 2000, David and Inez trusted and relied upon Richard, their son and attorney, and believed that resolution of the matter could be reached
without court action. R. 2891-2892. Richard's conduct and continued confidential and
fiduciary relationship with his parents concealed and misled David and Inez with respect
to the concealed intentions of the Allred Trusts that they did not intend to ever return title
to the property. R. 2889-2892.
After years of inaction and express acknowledgement of David and Inez's ownership of the Property, the Allred Trusts communicated with Qwest for the first time in
2000. R. 0093, 1896-1897. In June 2000 they executed an amendment to the then recent
1999 lease in a document entitled 'Third Amendment to Lease Agreement." R. 1896-97.
The Allred Trusts concealed the lease amendment from David and Inez, although the
trusts began in August 2000 to intercept the rental payments due from Qwest. R. 4395.
In the Third Amendment to Lease the Allred Trusts acknowledged to Qwest that Qwest
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had no notice of the quitclaim deeds made in 1982 and 1983 until 2000. R. 1896-1897.
In February 2001, just six months after learning of Richard's betrayal of their trust and
diversion of their rental income from Qwest, David and Inez Allred filed their complaint.
R. 0028.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

To prevail on an adverse possession claim, "the claimant must be in actual, open,
notorious, and exclusive possession of the property for seven years continuously, during
which time the claimant or his predecessors must pay 'all taxes which have been levied
and assessed upon such land according to law.'" Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d
1104, 1106 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted).
The lower court erred in concluding that, because of the lease to Qwest, David and
Inez could not establish the element of possession. Its decision is directly contrary to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-14, which provides that "the possession of the tenant is
deemed the possession of the landlord." That error formed the crux of the lower court's
entry of summary judgment against David and Inez, and requires reversal of the lower
court's summary judgment against David and Inez.
The lower court also erroneously analyzed other components of the adverse possession claim. The real issue before the court should have been identification of the landlord under the lease, because under § 78-12-14, the landlord is deemed to be in possession of the property. In this case, it was uncontroverted that David and Inez were the
landlords under the lease. Not only did each iteration of the lease identify them as the
landlords, but they also received the rents, paid income taxes on the rents, and managed
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the property. It is telling that, when asked to produce documents showing their involvement with the property from 1983 to 2000, the Allred Trusts had nothing to produce.
The lower court found other obstacles to be in the way of the adverse possession
claims. Those obstacles were either immaterial or illusory. Payment of property taxes
was accomplished under the lease. Because Qwest paid the taxes for the benefit of its
landlord, the law deems the taxes to have been paid by David and Inez. Possession was
not an issue, as the leases resolve it. A dispute concerning the names on the accounts to
which some rents were deposited was illusory, as the deposits were directed by David
and Inez, and the dispute related to exclusive possession of the rents, not the real issue
which was exclusive possession of the property. Finally, the lease arrangements between
Qwest and the Allred Trusts in 2000 occurred after the fact and were of no meaning in
determining whether by that time adverse possession had been established.
The lower court also erred in rejecting David and Inez's fraud-based claims on the
ground that the statute of limitations began to run in 1993 and had expired before suit was
filed in 2001. There was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to have concluded that
Richard owed fiduciary duties to David and Inez, and that he misled them into believing
that they did not need to assert their claims. His actions included preparation, during the
time when the statute allegedly ran, of tax returns attributing all rental income on the
property to David and Inez, and permitting David and Inez to enter leases in 1994 and
1999. These facts supported a claim of equitable estoppel, which should not have been
resolved against David and Inez by summary judgment.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
UTAH LAW PROHIBITS ADVERSE POSSESSION THROUGH
A TENANT.

The lower court's grant of summary judgment against David and Inez Allred on
their adverse possession claim was based upon a finding that they "were not personally in
possession of the Property at any time during the claimed adverse possession." Rejecting
the claim of possession through a tenant, the court held, "Lease type agreements between
a landlord and a tenant are not the type of use of the land that gives rise to adverse possession by a landlord. See Pender v. Jackson, 260 P.2d 542, 543 (Utah 1953)."
The lower court's decision that possession through a tenant cannot give rise to an
adverse possession claim is directly contrary to Utah law. The lower court should have
held, based on undisputed evidence before it, that David and Inez Allred were the landlords of Qwest during the relevant time frame, and granted their motion for summary
judgment on the adverse possession claim.
A.

Possession of a Tenant Is Deemed to Be Possession By the
Landlord.

One need look no further than the Utah Code to see that the lower court's decision—that possession through a tenant cannot give rise to an adverse possession claim—
is contrary to Utah law. The Code provides that the possession of a tenant is deemed to
be the possession of the landlord:
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any
persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy,
or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years
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from the time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant
may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to
his landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the periods herein
limited.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-14. Accord, Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137,
1139 (Utah 1986) (adverse possession claim upheld based on possession by claimant's
occupation "either personally or through her tenants, up until the commencement of this
action."); Bozeivich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239, 241 (1946) (adverse possession granted where the claimant "intended to assert and did assert ownership to the property by placing its tenants in possession, and did not recognize any right of redemption in
the original owner."); Adams v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1950) (adverse possession granted where claimant "initiated possession . . . by placing its lessee
.. . upon the lands.").3
The lower court concluded that "[l]ease type agreements between a landlord and a
tenant are not the type of use of the land that gives rise to adverse possession by a landlord," relying upon Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260 P.2d 542 (1953). R. 8082. The
Pender case, however, does not support this proposition. In Pender, the claimant as3

The purpose of the various adverse possession requirements is to give the alleged title
owner "seven years to notice that someone else is trying to take permanent possession of
the property." UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW § 2.08(a)(5)(iii) at p. 89. "[N]o more affirmative act of ownership can be asserted than the collection of the rents thereon." Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of the City of St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69,
83 (Mo. 1964) (en banc); accord, People v. Lapcheske, 73 Cal.App.4th 571, 575, 86
Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 568 (Cal. App. 1999) ("Renting the property and collecting the rent is
an act hostile to the interest of the actual title holder."). The public policy and statutory
objective of giving notice to the record title holder is more than adequately served by allowing an adverse possession claimant to occupy property through a tenant since a tenant
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serted that he often held land for "investment, speculation, lease, or the like," and that the
property in question was the type of unimproved land commonly held for speculation.
Accordingly, he argued that holding property for speculation was an "ordinary use of the
occupant" anticipated by the adverse possession statute. The Supreme Court held that the
subjective intent of the claimant as to his purpose in holding the land was immaterial to
the required objective "use" of the land and that "[n]either a hostile intent without such
occupation, nor such occupation without hostile intent, is sufficient." Id. at 543 (quoting
Madson v. Cohn, 122 Cal.App. 704, 10 P.2d 531, 532 (1932)).
Plainly, the claimant in Pender was not possessing the property through a tenant;
rather, the land was vacant. Pender, therefore, does not contradict settled Utah law that
possession through a tenant is sufficient possession by the landlord to satisfy Utah's adverse possession requirements. The lower court erred in applying a rule of law which is
contrary to § 78-12-14 and which lacks any support in the case law of Utah.
B.

The Lower Court Should Have Found the Remaining Elements of Adverse Possession to Have Been Established in Favor of David and Inez by Undisputed Evidence, and Should
Have Granted Summary Judgment in Their Favor.

The requirements for adverse possession are that "the claimant must be in actual,
open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the property for seven years continuously,
during which time the claimant or his predecessors must pay 'all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law.'" Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed,

is in physical possession of the property and will inform anyone interested the name of
the owner or landlord.
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739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). In this case, all of those elements
were established by uncontroverted evidence.
In its February 4, 2004 ruling, the lower court denied David and Inez's motion for
summary judgment on the adverse possession claim because it found genuine issues of
material fact in the following five areas: "[1] the parties dispute who paid the taxes on
the property and how; [2] the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs were in actual possession,
open and notorious to the claim of ownership to the property by Defendants; [3] the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the property during the
time in question; [4] the parties dispute the actual conveyance of the property by Plaintiffs to Defendants; and [5] questions of genuine issue also exist with respect to the lease
arrangements made by Defendants with Qwest subsequent to the transfer and recordation
of the property to Defendants." R. 5906.
The asserted issues of disputed fact lack support and are contrary to the undisputed
evidence. We address each claimed issue of fact in order.
1.

Who paid the taxes on the property and how.

There is no dispute that the lease with Qwest requires Qwest to pay the property
taxes on behalf of the landlord. David and Inez were the landlords of the lease until June
2000. It is undisputed that at all times from 1983 through 1999, all taxes on the property
were paid by Qwest either directly paying the taxing authority after David and Inez sent
them the property tax notice, or indirectly by reimbursing David and Inez after they paid
the taxes. The Allred Trusts have conceded that neither they nor the trustees paid any of
the taxes or property assessments at any time. R. 3014-3015, 4518-4521.
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As a matter of legal and logical analysis, the rents are nothing more than a portion
of the consideration which flows under the lease agreement. Thus, identification of
David and Inez in the lease as the parties legally entitled to receive the rent resolves the
question in their favor.
2.

Whether plaintiffs were in actual possession, open and
notorious to the claim of ownership to the property by
defendants.

From 1983 to 2000, David and Inez Allred were Qwest's landlords, and their actions as landlords were open, notorious, and adverse to the claims of the Allred Trusts. It
is undisputed that Qwest was in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the entire
Property from 1983 through June 2000.
The actions of David and Inez Allred concerning the Property are described in detail in the Statement of the Case, and can be summarized as follows:
1.
David and Inez Allred negotiated and executed, personally
and individually, each and every lease and lease amendment directly with
Qwest. Each document identified them as landlords and owners of the
property.
2.
From 1973 through August 2000, David and Inez Allred personally and exclusively received all funds and income generated by the
lease with Qwest. They directed the use of those funds without restriction.
3.
David and Inez Allred personally paid income taxes on the
rental income produced by the lease with Qwest. Indeed, Richard Allred
prepared and signed David and Inez Allred' tax returns in 1994, 1995,
1996, and 1997, each of which reported the income from the Property as
their personal income.
4.
From 1973 to June 2000, no persons other than David and
Inez Allred or agents of David and Inez Allred ever corresponded and
communicated with Qwest regarding any matter in regard to the Property.
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5.
From 1973 to the present, David and Inez Allred have consistently and continually held themselves out to all the world that they are the
landlords in the lease with Qwest and are the owners of the Property.
6.
Between 1974 and 1987, David and Inez Allred paid the
property taxes and obtained reimbursement from Qwest pursuant to the
lease. From 1988 through 1998, the lease provided that Qwest would pay
the taxes directly. In 1999, the property tax notice was sent to Richard Allred's address. The Trusts did not pay the taxes: rather, Richard delivered
the tax notice to David and Inez, who paid it and obtained reimbursement
from Qwest.
There is no evidence that the Allred Trusts had any contact whatsoever with
Qwest from 1983 until 2000. Indeed, when asked to produce documents evidencing their
management of the property, the Trusts had nothing to produce. Based upon the foregoing evidence, the lower court should have concluded that the question of David and
Inez's possession of the Property was undisputed.
3.

Whether plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the
property during the time in question.

The requirement of exclusive possession is a reference to the requirement that the
"adverse claimant's possession operate as an ouster of the possession of the true owner."
Adams v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1950). In other words, it means
that "[t]here cannot be a concurrent possession of land under conflicting claims of right."
3 AM. JUR. 2d Adverse Possession § 71 (2002). In the present case, there was undisputed
evidence that David and Inez's possession was exclusive as the term is defined in the
case law. David and Inez Allred negotiated and executed all leases and lease amendments from 1983 through May 2000, Qwest paid all rents to David and Inez Allred from
1983 through July 2000, and Qwest was in exclusive, continuous possession of the prop-
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erty from 1983 through May 2000. There is no evidence that David and Inez Alfred's
possession was not exclusive to all others.
The Allred Trusts argued to the lower court that a document referenced as "Bates
0771" raised three genuine issues of material fact: 1) because some of the Property rents
were paid into at least one of the accounts identified as "Genealogical Foundation" accounts, the document showed that David and Inez lacked control over the rents; 2) because Stephen J. Allred was an identified account holder with David and Inez and he
wrote checks against the account, the document showed that David and Inez's possession
of the rents was not exclusive; and 3) because the document asserted that some rents were
deposited into a "Genealogical Foundation" account held in the name of David and Inez
Allred and Richard G. Allred as a trustee of the foundation, the document showed that the
Allred Trusts shared the account with David and Inez and their possession was not exclusive. Each assertion lacks support in language of the document and undisputed facts and
no reasonable inferences support the Allred Trusts' position.
The Trusts' arguments do not go to the issue whether possession of the property
was exclusive; rather, they are offered to support an assertion that possession of the rents
was not exclusive. The exclusive possession requirement, however, refers to the property, not the rents.
Even if that were not the case, there is nothing about Bates 0771 which evidences
a lack of control over the rents. Bates 0771 purports to identify Stephen J. Allred and
Richard G. Allred as trustees of two Genealogical Foundation bank accounts in which
some Property rents were deposited.

Based on the document's reference to another
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document dated February 4, 1987, it is presumed Bates 0771 was created after that date.
David and Inez Allred had exclusive legal control over the rents as the parties legally entitled to receive rent under the lease. That they may have directed some of the rents deposited into accounts with other signatories does not evidence lack of exclusive control;
to the contrary, it evidences conclusively the right to control the use and disposition of
rents. There is no factual dispute that is applicable to the issue.
4.

The actual conveyance of the property by plaintiffs to
defendants.

Although Richard disputes that David and Inez signed the quitclaim deeds without
intending to convey legal and beneficial ownership, that dispute is immaterial to David
and Inez's adverse possession claim. Adverse possession does not require resolution of
any dispute concerning the basis for the claimant's possession, only that the claimant
demonstrate all statutory requirements. See Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d
1104, 1106 (Utah 1984) (elements of adverse possession).
5.

The lease arrangements made by defendants with
Qwest subsequent to the transfer and recordation of the
property to defendants.

The Allred Trusts acknowledged in the Third Amendment to Lease that Qwest
was never made aware of the quitclaim deeds and specifically "confirm[ed] and ratif[ied]
in all respects, the terms and conditions of the Lease, as amended by all prior amendments," including the 1987 letter modification concerning payment of property taxes, the
First and Second Amendments to Lease, and the identification in those amendments of
David and Inez Allred as the "Owners" and landlords of the Property. There is no evi-
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dence that the Allred Trusts made any "lease arrangements" with Quest other than the
Third Amendment to Lease executed in June 2000.
It is plain from the foregoing analysis that the five issues the lower court saw as
standing in the way of summary judgment in favor of David and Inez on their adverse
possession claim were illusory and immaterial. David and Inez satisfied all of the elements of adverse possession of the property under Utah law, and the lower court erred in
failing to recognize their claim and award them title by adverse possession.4
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE
ALLRED TRUSTS' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
BARRED DAVID AND INEZ ALLRED'S CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

The lower court entered summary judgment against David and Inez Allred on their
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages on the basis that the statute of limitations began to run no
later than February 15, 1993. The lower court applied the three and four-year statutes of
limitation found in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-26(3) (fraud) and 78-12-25(3) (breach of
fiduciary duty), respectively. R. 5904-5910. It is apparent from the lower court's own

4

The lower court's conclusion that its prior interpleader ruling was the law of the case as
to the adverse possession claims was error. The law of the case doctrine only applies
when the court "is presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed
upon by a coordinate judge in the same case." Trembly v. Mrs. Field's Cookies, 884 P.2d
1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). That is clearly not the case here. The merits of David
and Inez's adverse possession claim were never at issue in the interpleader motion and
thus, there was no prior "law of the case" on this claim nor any "decision on an issue at
one stage of the case" that should have been binding later. See Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734, 739 (Utah 1990).
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seven-page written ruling that the court entered summary judgment based on the statute
of limitations without addressing evidence that equitable estoppel and special circumstances barred the Allred Trusts' reliance on the statute of limitations.
A.

Richard Allred Owed Fiduciary Duties to His Parents.

Richard Allred owed fiduciary duties to David and Inez Allred because he occupied a confidential relationship with them.
A confidential relationship arises when one party, after having gained the
trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the
other party. If a confidential relationship exists between two parties to a
transaction, and if the superior party (in whom trust has been reposed)
benefits from the transaction, a presumption of undue influence is raised.
Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (footnote omitted). "A
confidential or fiduciary relationship is presumed between parent and child, attorney and
client, and trustee and cestui que trust." Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984)
(citing Blodgett v. Martch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)). Moreover, a "fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract or by circumstances where equity will
imply a higher duty in a relationship because the trusting party has been induced to relax
the care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise."

Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Un-

ionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1982). Attorney-client relationships are "confidential" within the meaning of fiduciary law. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1200-02 (Utah 1985).
A "course of dealing between persons [in a confidential or fiduciary relationship]
is watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace
of undue influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured party."
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Blodgett v. Martch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted). Moreover, a party
is entitled to rely on the representations of a person who owes that party a fiduciary duty.
See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54-55 (Utah 1996) (plaintiffs entitled to rely on
defendant's representations "because of his fiduciary duty to disclose his conflicting interests to his co-directors.").
The evidence in this case supports a fiduciary relationship and the lower court
erred in solving that issue by summary judgment. Richard was David and Inez's trusted
son, long-time attorney, and tax advisor. He acted as his parents' attorney in the very
transaction in which Richard claims to have acquired an interest in the property. His
close, personal relationship with David and Inez endured until August 2000 when the Allred Trusts diverted the Qwest rents. R. 113-114, 2710-2711. They had "explicit confidence in" him. R. 2894. His attorney-client relationship endured at least until April
1998, the last time he prepared and signed David and Inez's tax returns attributing to
them the Property rents and expenses. David and Inez were entitled to rely on Richard's
representations, admissions, and conduct because he held that position of confidence and
trust with them.
B.

The Lower Court Erred in Refusing to Apply Equitable Estoppel to Toll the Statute of Limitations.

"Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense." Rice v. Granite School District, 456
P.2d 159, 162-63 (Utah 1969) (quoting Dettamanti v. Lampoc Union School District, 143
Cal.App.2d 715, 300 P.2d 78, 81 (1956)). The elements of equitable estoppel are:
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(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989).
In order to establish equitable estoppel to defeat a statute of limitations defense,
'"it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking
such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved
himself from loss.'"

Rice, 456 P.2d at 162 (quoting Dettamanti, 300 P.2d at 81).

Whether estoppel bars a defendant's statute of limitations defense depends on the facts
and circumstances giving rise to the claimed estoppel. Id. at 163.
A case which requires the court to weigh the reasonableness of a party's conduct
regarding the application of a defense to the statute of limitations "necessitates the type of
factual findings which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases."
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996) (applying rule to affirmative concealment); Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52 \ 5, 979 P.2d 823 (fact-intensive balancing test required in special circumstances situations); Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (estoppel requires a fact-intensive determination by
the trier of fact).
Based on the lower court's written ruling, the court appears to have relied solely
on three demand letters sent by David to Richard from 1991 to 1993. The lower court's
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opinion, however, ignored the parties' fiduciary relationship, as well as the entire context
of the letters and the events that followed them.
Other than avoiding the issue, Richard did nothing in that time to suggest that he
would not honor his aging parents' wishes. For example, Richard prepared David and
Inez Allred's tax returns for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 (signed in 1998). In
each of those returns he asserted that David and Inez were not only entitled to the income
from the Property, but were legally obligated to pay income tax on it. He continued to allow them unfettered control not only of the rents, but of the lease documents themselves,
as evidenced by the negotiations in 1994 and 1999. He delivered the tax notices to them,
and in every respect was at pains not to suggest that he had not acquiesced in their request.
Richard's complete failure to act is inconsistent with his present claim to exclusive
ownership of the property. This conclusion is bolstered by the fiduciary duty Richard
owed to his parents, which imposed on him an obligation of disclosure. Having misled
his parents and failed to disclose his true position, he cannot now be heard to complain
that his parents did not act timely to protect their interests.
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that David and Inez
relied on the Richard's acknowledgement that David and Inez were the rightful owners of
the rent income in not pursuing legal action sooner. Accordingly, summary judgment on
the equitable estoppel claim was error.
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C.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Also Preclude the Lower
Court's Conclusion as a Matter of Law that the Special Circumstances Exception Did Not Toll the Statute of Limitations.

The "special circumstances exception," also known as "equitable tolling," applies
to toll the applicable statute of limitations in "exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would be 'irrational' or 'unjust.'" Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52
1 5 , 979 P.2d 823 (citing Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted)).
The special circumstances exception does not require an initial showing that the
party did not know or could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitations period. Beaver County v. Property Tax
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 6 f|[ 29, 44, 128 P.3d 1187. The special circumstances exception requires "the party seeking equitable tolling [to] first show
that he was indeed disabled, usually through a defect of knowledge for which he could
not be held responsible, from protecting his claim." Id. at ^[43. The special circumstances exception applies when the party seeking equitable relief demonstrates that his
actions were excusable or reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at f 32. The special
circumstances exception also requires a balancing of the "hardship imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the passage of time." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 636. Some factors considered in
this balancing are "whether the defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are
greater than the plaintiff's . . . and whether the claim has aged to the point that witnesses
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cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot remember basic
events." Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995).
Although Richard refused to openly discuss with his parents returning record title
to the Property, he expressly acknowledged through his actions David and Inez Allred's
equitable title in the Property when he prepared and signed David and Inez's 1994, 1995,
1996, and 1997 tax returns and attributed the rents and expenses of the Property to David
and Inez. Moreover, David and Inez Allred continued throughout the 1990s to receive
and spend the rent proceeds from the Property without interruption or interference from
Richard. Richard's express and implied acknowledgement of David and Inez's right to
the Property justified their ongoing reliance and trust in him that this matter could and
would be resolved without litigation. Richard's acknowledgement also reasonably explained to David and Inez Allred that Richard's refusal to return record title to the Property was more about Richard's objection to David and Inez donating the property to their
church than it was about a substantive claim to the property based on the Quitclaim
Deeds. Under these circumstances, David and Inez Allred reasonably believed that in
time Richard would return record title to the property and that litigation was unnecessary.
It was not until June 2000 that Richard took any action contrary to David and Inez
Allred's title when he signed a new lease with Qwest and diverted the lease payments to
the Allred Trusts. Once they learned that Richard had repudiated his prior express and
implied acknowledgement of David and Inez Allred's ownership, David and Inez immediately took action and filed the present claims in February 2001.
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Although this Court warned in Estes and in Beaver County that special circumstances exception should be limited to "egregious circumstances," such circumstances exist here. Equity applies to prevent injustice and it is the "object of equity to prevent the
application of a universal legal principle in an eventuality where unconscionable and unjustifiable hardship must otherwise ensue." Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah
1981) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
The undisputed facts ignored by the lower court show that Richard Allred misled
David and Inez Allred, who had a basic "defect of knowledge" directly caused by Richard's conduct. David and Inez, based on years of experience with Richard as their son,
attorney, and tax advisor, reasonably believed that the Property dispute would be resolved
within the family without litigation. Richard affirmed his parents' belief by expressly
and impliedly affirming their ownership of the Property multiple times between 1993 and
June 2000.
The application of the statute of limitations here would work an unconscionable
and unjustifiable hardship upon David and Inez Allred and would reward Richard's
fraudulent conduct. David and Inez Allred would be without any remedy against a oncetrusted son, attorney, and fiduciary simply because they reasonably refused to escalate a
family dispute into a public legal action based solely on Richard's conduct. Based on the
undisputed material facts viewed in a light most favorable to David and Inez Allred, reversal of summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is warranted.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellants request that this Court reverse the decision of
the lower court and remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants on
their adverse possession claim; and for trial of appellants' breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages claims.
DATED this ] 1 _ day of December, 2006.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT"
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H ALLRED, et al.,

CASE NUMBER: 010400765

Plaintiffs
DATED: OCTOBER 2, 2001
vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, et al.

RULING

Defendants
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

This case is before the court on a laundry list of motions heard by the court
on September 10, 2001. Michael Carlston represented plaintiffs on all of the
motions except Inez Allred's motion to dismiss counterclaim, Cory Memmott
represented Inez Allred on her motion to dismiss counterclaim, Richard G. Allred
appeared on all of the motions for the defendants, and Blaine Rawson represented
QWEST Corporation. Having considered the arguments and the memoranda of the
parties, I now issue this ruling.
I.

Motion for interpleader of building rents.

Plaintiffs and QWEST Corporation jointly move the court for an order
compelling QWEST to interplead the rents it owes on certain property located in
Provo, Utah. Plaintiffs assert that they have a claim to the rents, as the trust
agreements which David and Inez Allred executed in 1982 were never fully

1
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operational. Richard Allred, to the contrary, claims that the funds from QWEST
belong to the trusts, as the trusts were created long ago and David and Inez Allred
signed and recorded deeds conveying the property to the trusts in 1982.
The documents provided by Richard Allred demonstrate that the property
leased by QWEST is owned by the trusts, David and Inez Allred having conveyed
it to the trusts in 1982. Though plaintiffs assert that they have a colorable claim to
the lease rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face of the documents provided by the
parties, the property is owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be paid to the
trusts.1
I deny the motion to interplead the rents. QWEST is directed, pending
further hearing and order of the court, to pay all lease rents to the trusts, which
own, and have owned, the property for many years. As well, I vacate that portion
of the order of the court issued on July 27, 2001, which required QWEST to
interplead the rents, and direct that all rents now held by the clerk of the court be
paid over to the Allred trusts. The balance of the order issued on July 27, 2001
which dismissed QWEST from the action may stand.

1

Subsequent to the hearing, and not consistent with any provision of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiffs submitted a letter with certain income tax forms attached which they
claim demonstrate that Richard Allred agreed with plaintiffs' claim that the funds from the
QWEST lease should be handled outside of the trusts executed in 19S2. I am not persuaded.
First, such submissions, provided by letter after the hearing when they clearly were available to
plaintiffs in time to have been included in the prior pleadings, were submitted outside of any
provision of the rule and merit no serious consideration. Second, all the tax forms indicate is
that some rents were included in David and Inez's income. They do not, however, indicate
which rents were being claimed.
2

II.

Motion to dismiss counterclaim.

Following the filing of a reply to the counterclaim brought against her by
Richard Allred, Inez Allred then filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim under
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Richard Allred objects to the
motion.
Resolution of this motion is simple. Though she vigorously asserts that the
counterclaim is without merit and must be dismissed, Inez Allred fails to address
the essential issue raised by Richard Allred: that her filing of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is untimely. In part, that rule provides:
Every defense . . . shall be asserted in a responsive pleading thereto
if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . A motion making any
of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading
is permitted. . . .
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the pleadings consist
of a complaint, an answer and "a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such . . .

Here is what occurred. On February 15, 2001, David and Inez Allred filed
a complaint. In response, on March 6, 2001, Richard Allred and others filed an
answer to the complaint and also asserted a counterclaim. Then, on April 2, 2001,
David and Inez Allred filed a reply to the counterclaim. Subsequently Inez Allred
filed this motion, which she asserts is brought under Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the
counterclaim.

3

Rule 12(b)(6) requires, for it uses the word "shall"2, that a motion
thereunder must be brought before any further pleadings are filed. Applied to this
case, the motion which Inez Allred now brings should have been brought before
she filed her reply to the counterclaim. Since she did not follow that procedure,
she no longer has a right to bring a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). If she has a
remedy short of trial, it belongs under Rule 12(c) or Rule 56.
I deny the motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
III.

Motion to compel production of documents (clergy letters).

Richard Allred seeks disclosure to him of certain letters written by Inez
Allred to Bishop Ralph Mabey and to Blaine Colton. Inez Allred asserts that the
letters are privileged communications to clergy and thus not discoverable. I have
reviewed these letters in camera.
Rule 503(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the privilege in this
state for communications to clergy:
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another
from disclosing any confidential communication to a cleric in the
cleric's religious capacity and necessary and proper to enable the
cleric to discharge the functions of the cleric's office according to
the usual course of practice or discipline.
This is a very broad privilege, although it does not extend to

1

"Kunkel has presented no reason why this court should not interpret the rule's use of
•shair as mandatory. See, e.g., Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127. 1131 (Utah 1990)
(interpreting 'shall' in joinder rule as mandatory); Board ofEduc. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) (noting that word 'shall' is 'usually presumed
mandatory/ requiring the person 4to comply strictly with the terms of the statutes' or rules)/'
Ostler v. Buhler, 989 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 1999).
4

communications that are not of a religious aspect or nature. See, Ellis v. United
States, 922 F. Supp. 539 (D. Utah 1996). Ellis, however, does not apply in this
case as the content of the letters is of a religious nature.
The beginning point for any analysis is whether the letters were to a cleric
as defined in Rule 503(a)(1). I find that they were.
Rule 503(a)(1) provides that a cleric "is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other
similar functionary of a religious organization or an individual reasonably believed
so to be by the person consulting that individual." In this case the letters in
question were addressed and delivered to Bishop Ralph Mabey and to Blaine
Colton. Bishop Mabey and Stake President Browning, to whom Ms. Allred
apparently sent a copy of the letter to Bishop Mabey, were both LDS Church
functionaries similar to a rabbi or minister. Blaine Colton was reasonably believed
by Ms. Allred to be a bishop in the LDS Church (indeed, he formerly was Richard
Allred's bishop). Moreover, it is clear that Ms. Allred addressed these men in a
religious capacity as she called them "Bishop" and "Stake President" - their titles
as functionaries in the LDS Church - and requested counsel from them as religious
leaders.3
The second issue which must be resolved is whether the letters were written

3

Richard Allred asserts that Blaine Colton had been released as his ward bishop for
several years and that when Inez Allred contacted Mr. Colton, she was told as much. Thus.
Richard Allred claims. Inez Allred could not have reasonably believed that Mr. Colton was a
bishop to whom the privilege would apply. Though Richard Allred makes these assertions,
there is nothing of substance in the record to support the claims. Given the tenor of the letter
by Inez Allred to Mr. Colton, it is clear she was addressing him in his capacity as a bishop in
the LDS Church.
5
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to the cleric in his "religious capacity and necessary and proper to enable the cleric
to discharge the functions of the cleric's office according to the usual course of
practice and discipline." I have reviewed each of the letters and conclude that in
fact they were written to Bishop Mabey and to Blaine Colton in each of their
religious capacities and for the purpose of enabling them to fulfill their duties in
the ususal course of practice and discipline of the LDS Church. Having reviewed
the letters, I find that the matter is not susceptible of reasonable dispute.
Finally, from my review of the letters, it is clear that the letters were
"confidential communications" in that they were private communications which
were not intended for further disclosure except to other persons in furtherance of
the purpose of the communication. See, U.R.E. 503(a)(2).
Given these findings, I conclude that the letters are subject to the privilege
provided in Rule 503.4
Rule 503(c) provides that the person who made the confidential
communication may claim the protection of the Rule 503 privilege. Ms. Allred is
the undisputed author of the letters at issue, and she claims the privilege. The
letters are privileged communications to clergy which are protected from
disclosure.

4

Richard Allred argued that Ellis applies and that these letters are to a cleric in an
executive or administrative capacity. It appears his assertion is grounded in that claim that
Bishop Mabey and former Bishop Colton served in Richard Allred's ward, not in Inez Allred's
ward. Though I accept this factual assertion as true. I nonetheless conclude that the letters were
not written in an executive or administrative capacity, but to a cleric in the usual course of
practice or discipline of the LDS Church.
6

I deny the motion to compel their production.
IV.

Motion to compel initial disclosures.

Plaintiffs assert defendants did not comply with the initial disclosure
requirements of Rule 26(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The heart of
defendants' opposition is that plaintiffs also have not made full and complete
initial disclosures.
As the latter issue is not properly before the court, I decline to consider it.
Rather, I address the adequacy of defendants' initial disclosures.
Simply put, defendants' initial disclosures are inadequate. They do not
provide the name, address and telephone numbers of any individuals likely to have
discoverable information supporting their defenses. Surely there are some
individuals who have some information which may be discoverable. I do not
accept defendants' failure to identify any individuals who may have discoverable
information. The initial disclosures also do not contain copies of all documents
which they may have which support their defenses. Some documents which
defendants possess but which they did not provide have been identified by
plaintiffs. Perhaps others also exist. Finally, defendants do not have any
computation of damages described in their counterclaim.
I grant the motion to compel initial disclosures and award attorney's fees in
the sum of S350.
V.

Motion to quash subpoena to Wells Fargo Bank

Post-hearing Richard Allred filed a motion to quash a subpoena which
7

plaintiffs' counsel had served upon Well Fargo Northwest, N.A., (formerly First
Security Bank).
On the record now before the court I grant the motion. First, plaintiffs are
hard pressed to claim they cannot obtain the information of monies paid by
QWEST for property rent from QWEST.5 QWEST intervened in this action, and
though it has now been dismissed, plaintiffs can obtain from it a full accounting of
what rents have been paid and to whom. Second, what the trust beneficiaries have
done with the rent proceeds is not relevant to the issue before the court in this case:
the ownership of the trust property. Third, whether the trust has contingent funds
available for other purposes also is irrelevant to the present case.
The test for discovery is whether the requested evidence is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In this case, where the
connection is as tenuous as it is here, where plaintiffs can access that information
from other sources readily available to them, and where the requested evidence is
of private banking matters that do not answer the essential question in this action, I
grant the motion to quash the subpoena without prejudice to being renewed if
plaintiffs demonstrate a compelling need for the bank records.
VI.

Motion for protective order regarding David H. Allred and

joint petition for appointment of guardian and conservator.
Plaintiffs have submitted these two matters for decision. I decline to reach

3

In the memoranda supporting their motion to compel initial disclosures, plaintiffs
assert that they obtained much information from QWEST. This establishes that if plaintiffs
really want to know to whom rent was paid, they easily can obtain that information already.
8

either at the present time.
At the hearing of September 10, 2001,1 directed that certain medical
records of David Allred be provided to defendants. Plaintiffs assert that they
possess no medical records for David Allred during the year September 2000 to
September 2001. In an effort to keep the matter moving forward, however, they
did provide copies of medical records from February and March 2000 which
appear to establish that David Allred, on account of the effects of age, has
significant cognitive problems. Those records, however, reference anticipated
follow-up medical care.
Plaintiffs are directed to provide to defendants copies of all medical records
of David Allred from February 1, 2000 to the present. Once all these records are
provided, defendants may have ten days to respond to the motion for protective
order and petition for appointment of guardian and conservator. Plaintiffs, of
course, may file a reply. Once this new briefing is complete any party may file a
new notice to submit.
Conclusion.
I have attempted to rule on all matters before the court at the time of the
September 10, 2001 hearing and all matters that have been noticed for submission
post-hearing. The parties may notify the court in writing if I have failed to address
any matter.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs'
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order which encompasses all of these
9

19
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rulings together with the rulings made at the time of the hearing of September 10,
2001.
Dated this ^_ day of October, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

10

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of October, 2001:

Richard AJlred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Richard Allred
1527 Vineyard Dr.
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Michael Carlston
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Cory Memmott
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010
Blaine Rawson
111 East Broadway
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CARMA BUSH
CLERK OF THE COURT

l|eputy Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H ALLRED and INEZ H ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RICHARD G ALLRED, individually and a
Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST, THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST, THE
MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER ALLRED
TRUST, THE STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED
TRUST, THE KAREN ALLRED TRUST,
THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, THE
MARY LEE ALLRED TRUST, MARY LEE
ALLRED as Trustee for THE RICHARD G
ALLRED TRUST and QWEST
CORPORATION,

RULING
CASE NO. 010400765
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT
CLERK: KS

Defendants.
RULING
On January 23, 2004, counsel for the parties appeared before the Court to argue and
address a number of motions that had been filed by each. Prior to oral argument the Court had
reviewed all of the materials supplied by each party, which consisted of approximately 5 large 3ring binders. Upon the completion of oral argument, the Court immediately ruled on some of the
issues addressed and took others under advisement. The three matters taken under advisement
were the claims associated with adverse possession, which were the joint motions by the parties
concerning adverse possession, Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment as to statute
of limitations, and Defendants' renewed motion for partial summary judgment on individual
causes of action. Upon hearing oral arguments and reading of the applicable statutes and case law
addressing the issues concerning the three matters taken under advisement, the Court now enters

591.1

its rulings as follows:
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
Defendant Richard G Allred individually, and as a trustee for the Allred Trusts, moved the
Court for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. It is the position of Defendants
that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. §78-12-25(3) is a four
year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for breach of fiduciary
duty. §78-12-26(3) is the applicable statute of limitations with respect to Plaintiffs' Second Cause
of Action for fraud. Plaintiffs' third, fourth and sixth causes of action are derivative of the First
and Second Causes of Action and therefore the statutes as referenced above are applicable.
Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action pertains to the claim of adverse possession and both parties
concede that such claim is not subject to disposition on statute of limitations grounds.
On or about December 27, 1982, David H Allred as trustor created nine separate,
irrevocable trusts. The trustee for each trust was Richard G Allred, except as to his trust, and the
various beneficiaries were Richard Allred and his brother Stephen Allred and their families. On or
about December 30, 1982, Inez H Allred and David H Allred conveyed a 50% interest in a piece
of real property located in Provo, Utah to the Allred Trusts by Quit Claim Deed. The deed was
notarized as to the signatures of both Inez and David Allred and was recorded on December 30,
1982. On or about January or February 3, 1983, Inez H Allred and David H Allred conveyed
their remaining 50% interest in the Provo property to the Allred Trusts by Quit Claim Deed. The
deed was notarized as to the signatures of both Inez and David Allred and was recorded on
February 7, 1983. The facts of the case as presented supports a finding by this Court that from
the time of recordation of the second deed until approximately December 1991 there was little, if
any, communication between Inez and David Allred and Richard G Allred, individually or as
trustee for the respective trusts concerning the Provo property.
In 1991 the Court finds that Inez and David Allred desired to convey the Provo property
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and thereafter contacted Richard G Allred
indicating their desires. The Court finds that on or about December 1991 David H Allred
demanded that Richard G Allred transfer the title to the Provo property back to Inez and David
Allred to which Richard Allred refused. On or about May 20, 1992, David Allred signed a letter

CCk

:y

addressed "To Whom it May Concern" which was directed to family members discussing Richard
Allred's refusal to transfer the Provo property back to his mother and father. In the May 20,
1992 letter, Mr. David Allred stated "I approached Richard to honor my wishes and cooperate in
returning the titleship to my or our property, but he was in a state of rebellion and refused to even
discuss the matter. He finally suggested that we should have a family meeting and obtain their
wishes or opinions." That discussion took place prior to January 6, 1992. Mr. David Allred then
goes on to say "Jan 25, 92, we called a meeting of the family ... our meeting was a disaster and
Richard left in a most unhappy and belligerent mood. I was so distraught to think my own son did
not want to approve of my church gift of our very own property, which was never intended for
him to have it in the manner in which he has secured it, together with his disapproval of us giving
it to the church." Mr. Allred goes on to state in that letter "Mr. Bradley (David Allred's personal
counsel) says the reasons for claiming the property are not valid and amount to only a con action
against his father and mother, on the part of Richard." In addition, the May 20, 1992, letter
threatened "strenuous action forcing Richard to return the title" to the Provo property. Based on
the information provided by the parties by way of memoranda and supporting documents, counsel
established that Inez H Allred gave deposition testimony that the "strenuous action" being
threatened was "a legal suit." Deposition of Inez H Allred October 14, 2003.
On or about January 25, 1993, David H Allred and Inez H Allred both signed the letter to
Richard G Allred. In that letter the following statement was made: "Richard, whatever your
decision on February 15, let's have it, either give us your signature as we have asked on the
enclosed form, or go about your way of ignoring us. We will then know how to proceed in either
event of your choice." On or about February 13, 1993, David H Allred wrote to Richard G
Allred regarding the Provo property the following: "I pray that you will indicate that you will or
that you have already signed the deed. If your answer is negative, or if you return without giving
us an answer, I will have to conclude that your answer is to be negative. In this event, I will have
to proceed with such action as I deem necessary." Shortly thereafter on February 16, 1993,
David H Allred again wrote to Richard G Allred the following: "Well, February 15 has come and
gone. Let's think in terms of March 15 as the time given for you to respond by signing the
enclosed document. If you do not return the signed deed with your signature by the above date
we will have to assume that you do not intend to return our property and we will have to act
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accordingly." On February 15, 2001, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for the above entitled action.
It is clear to this Court that any claims which Plaintiffs believed they had against
Defendants with respect to the Provo property accrued at least by December 1991, ten years prior
to the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint. Both Plaintiffs signed a letter to Richard Allred establishing
February 15, 1993, as the deadline for reconveyance of the Provo property. There is no question
that that letter put Richard Allred on notice that if he failed to convey the property as requested
Plaintiffs would take legal action to enforce their claims against him. This Court finds that the
filing of the above entitled action on February 15, 2001, was not a timely filing and that the claims
noted above are barred by reason of the applicable statute of limitations.
Defendants argue that the applicable statutes bar Plaintiffs' suit. On the other hand,
Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule. According to
Plaintiffs, Defendants and in particular Richard Allred, misled them into believing that he would
work with them in resolving the dispute with respect to the reconveyance of the Provo property,
thereby tolling the statute. They contend that they had no reason to know that they had a cause
of action against Richard Allred and other Defendants until shortly prior to the filing in 2001 by
reason of the communication and contact by Richard Allred with Qwest. Defendants respond that
the statute is not tolled by the discovery rule because Plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence in
discovering their cause of action nor did they exercise due diligence in continuing to believe that
in spite of Richard Allred's refusals to sign the deeds that he would sometime down the road do
so. In the present case all of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims were long past by 2001
and the only triggering event was the constant refusal by Richard Allred to sign the reconveyance
documents as continually requested by Plaintiffs.
The statute of limitations commences when the lawsuit can be brought, not when it can no
longer by avoided. "Generally, a cause of action occurs upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action." Spears vs Warr 44 P3rd 742, 754 (Utah 2002).
Plaintiffs knew or should have know that Richard Allred was not going to reconvey the subject
property as early as December 1991. By February 1993 Plaintiffs actually knew, by constantly
extending the deadline, that Mr. Allred had not only failed to comply with their request but was
continuing to refuse to meet the deadline signing date as imposed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs knew or
should have known that Defendants and in particular Richard Allred on behalf of the trust and

trustees was not going to sign and deliver the requested reconveyance documents as requested by
Plaintiffs. This event occurred four years or more prior to when the complaint was filed and the
discovery rule did not toll the statue to permit Plaintiffs' claims to continue against Defendants.
Therefore Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fourth and sixth causes of action are barred by the
Statute of Limitations §78-12-25(3), and § 78-12-26(3) UCA. Therefore, this Court need not
resolve any motions addressed by Defendants as to Plaintiffs' causes of action except the Fifth
Cause of Action for adverse possession.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their Fifth Cause of Action for relief for
adverse possession claiming that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Plaintiffs are
entitled to judgment as to adverse possession as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant
Richard G Allred, in addition to being the son of Plaintiffs, was also their attorney, tax preparer
and advisor. They contend that Richard Allred persuaded his parents to transfer the Provo
property for tax benefits. They further contend that they did not actually intend to transfer
ownership but only intended to surrender title to the subject property to assist them in saving
taxes. Plaintiffs also argue that after the deeds were recorded nothing changed by way of the
positions of the parties with respect to the manner in which they used and treated the property.
Plaintiffs claim that the parents continued to receive rent from the property from the telephone
company and continued to be recognized as the owners by the tenants. Plaintiffs also claim that
either they or the tenants paid the taxes on the Provo property and in all respects continued to
treat the property as their own. In considering the motions, the Court believes some background
information is appropriate.
In approximately 1972, Plaintiffs acquired the property located in Provo, Utah. In or
about August 1973, Plaintiffs leased the Provo property to the Mountain States Telephone
Company and the property continued to be used and operated under the lease to the present time
with the lessee now Qwest. In December 1982, a quit claim deed was prepared and recorded
which conveyed 50% interest in the Provo property from Plaintiffs to the Allred trusts. In 1983,
an additional quit claim deed was recorded purporting to convey the remaining 50% interest in the
Provo property to the Allred trusts. The Court finds that no one notified the tenants of the
transfer and recordation of the new owner.
In approximately December 1991, David and Inez Allred decided that they wanted to
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donate the Provo property to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. They contacted
Richard Allred as trustee of the trust and requested that he sign the property back to them by way
of a quit claim deed. Richard Allred refused to comply with multiple requests by Plaintiffs that he
reconvey the property back to the Plaintiffs. On or about December 1982, David and Inez Allred
as trustors created nine separate irrevocable trusts making Richard Allred trustee of eight of the
trusts, with Mary Allred being the trustee on the ninth trust to the benefit of Richard Allred. The
beneficiaries were David and Inez Allred's two sons, Stephen and Richard, and their families.
Defendants filed a counter motion for summary judgment as to adverse possession.
Defendants claim that all taxes on the property during the time in question were paid by the
telephone company, that Qwest acknowledged that the trusts owned the property and that David
and Inez Allred were no longer the owners of the property; that the irrevocable trusts established
for the purpose of conveying the property to the trusts conveyed away all ownership and rights
that David and Inez Allred may have had to the trust property, thereby vesting title to the
grantees; and that any claim of open, notorious and adverse possession by David and Inez Allred
is not supported by the facts of the case.
According to the case law mutually relied upon by both parties, the claim for adverse
possession can only be granted when the claimant is successful in proving that such possession has
been actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of the property for seven years
continuously during which time the claimant paid all taxes owing on the property. Royal St Land
Company vs Reed 739 P2nd 1104, (Utah 1984).
Based upon the claims of the parties and the representations made in their respective
motions concerning adverse possession, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material
fact and questions of law which prohibit this Court from granting either motion. For example, the
parties dispute who paid the taxes on the property and how; the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs
were in actual possession, open and notorious to the claim of ownership to the property by
Defendants; the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the property
during the time in question; the parties dispute the actual conveyance of the property by Plaintiffs
to Defendants; and questions of genuine issue also exist with respect to the lease arrangements
made by Defendants with Qwest subsequent to the transfer and recordation of the property to
Defendants. The resolution of the issue of adverse possession is fact-sensitive and this Court is

unable to determine from all of the information provided where the facts and law fall with respect
to the claims of adverse possession.
Based upon the findings made herein, counsel for Defendants shall prepare the appropriate
findings and order consistent with this ruling and submit the same to the Court within 30 days of
the date of this ruling.
DATED this

h

day of

7^72004.
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE OF
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. ALLRED,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

ORDER REGARDING
JULY 26, 2004 HEARING

RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD
MARK ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST;
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants and Appellees.

Civil No. 010400765

RICHARD G. ALLRED and MARY LEE ALLRED,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal representative for
the Estate of DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Counter-defendants.

Judge Anthony Schofield

This case came on regularly for hearing before the Court on July 26, 2004 at which
plaintiff Inez H. Ailred and Mary Ailred Jensen, as personal representative of the Estate of David
H. Ailred, were represented by their counsel, Michael R. Carlston of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau. Cory D. Memmott of Plant, Christensen & Kanell, counsel for the defense of Inez H.
Ailred on the counterclaim, was also present. Defendants Mary Lee Ailred, trustee for The
Richard G. Ailred Trust, and Richard G. Ailred, individually, appeared pro se, and Peter Stirba of
Stirba & Associates appeared for Richard G. Ailred, Trustee of the Ailred Trusts.
The following motions were presented to the Court: (1) plaintiffs' Motion in Limine for a
Ruling Permitting Demonstrative Aids During Opening Statements, Trial, and Closing
Arguments; (2) plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Concerning Accounting Claims; (3) plaintiffs'
Motion in Limine Restricting Presentation of Evidence to Certain Matters; (4) Defendants'
Motion in Limine re: Plaintiffs' Alleged Adverse Possession Through Possession of a Tenant; (5)
Defendants' Motion in Limine Re: Judge Schofield's October 2, 2001 Ruling is grajrtegfr(6)
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Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Gifts and Bequests to Richard Ailred and his Family; (7)
Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Validity of Title to Property Held by Trustees of the Ailred
Trusts; (8) Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Interpretation of the Trust Agreements; (9)
Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Relevant Time Period for Proving Adverse Possession; (WQ)
0
Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Tax Returns of David H. Ailred 1983-2000; (Y) Defendants'
Motion in Limine Precluding Plaintiffs; Use of a Video Tape of David H. Ailred and Inez H.
Ailred Made in April 2000: (12) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Introduction of
Documents and Testimony that Plaintiffs Paid the Taxes on the Provo Property From 1983-2000:
and (13) Plaintiffs" Motion to Strike Motions by Richard G. Ailred.
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Having reviewed the briefs, exhibits, and affidavits submitted, the Court heard oral
argument, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The plaintiffs' Motion in Limine for a Ruling Permitting Demonstrative Aids

During Opening Statements, Trial, and Closing Arguments is granted only to the extent that the
parties wish to use documents, visual aids, and/or media stipulated to by the parties. The parties
may not use video deposition testimony for any purpose when the witness is available at trial, but
use of depositions shall only be available as a written document.
2.

That plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Concerning Accounting Claims is granted to the

extent it requests bifurcation of the accounting claims from the trial on other issues, denied as to
its demand that no party be permitted to make any mention of the accounting issues to the jury,
and denied to the extent it asserts a reciprocal right to an accounting as an equitable remedy
available to plaintiffs at trial.
3.

That plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Restricting Presentation of Evidence to Certain

Matters is granted in that the parties may not present evidence at trial contrary to the conclusions
and findings of the Court in its January 23, 2004 hearing and February 6. 2004 Ruling and in that
the parties are required to raise during trial any objection to evidence that the parties believe is
contrary to facts admitted by a party during discovery.
4.

That Defendants" Motion in Limine re: Plaintiffs' Alleged Adverse Possession

Through Possession of a Tenant is granted in that plaintiffs may not present evidence at trial of
possession by a tenant to establish the requirements of adverse possession. Because it is clear
that plaintiffs" evidence relies upon such evidence to demonstrate adverse possession, this ruling
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effectively grants judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' cause of action for adverse
possession and this issue is removed from consideration at trial. The Court finds that plaintiffs
were not personally in possession of the Provo property at any time during the claimed adverse
possession. Lease type agreements between a landlord and a tenant are not the type of use of the
land that gives rise to adverse possession by a landlord. See Pender v. Jackson 260 P.2d 542,
543 (Utah 1953). Utah law regards adverse possession as a claim brought by one who actually
uses the land. In this case, plaintiffs have never used the land in question in any manner
inconsistent with what the trustees would expect. Likewise, no adverse possession claim existed
wherein the plaintiffs deeded valid title ownership of the Provo property to the Allred trustees in
1982 and 1983.
5.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Judge Scho field's October 2, 2001 Ruling

is granted on the basis that it remains the law of the case in this matter. Judge Schofield stated in
his 10/2/01 Ruling that "the Provo property is owned by the Allred Trusts and the lease rents
should be paid to the Allred Trusts." There has been no intervening change in controlling
authority since October 2, 2001. No new evidence on this issue has arisen since October 2, 2001.
6.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Gifts and Bequests to Richard Allred and

his Family was withdrawn by counsel at the hearing.
7.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Validity of Title to Property Held by

Trustees of the Allred Trusts was withdrawn by counsel at the hearing.
8.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Interpretation of the Trust Agreements

was withdrawn b\ counsel at the hearing.
9.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Relevant Time Period for Proving
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Adverse Possession was withdrawn by counsel at the hearing.
10.

That Defendants" Motion in Limine re: Tax Returns of David H. Allred

1983-2000 is rendered moot by the judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' adverse
possession claim.
11.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine Precluding Plaintiffs' Use of a Video Tape of

David H. Allred and Inez H. Allred Made in April 2000 is rendered moot by the judgment in
favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' adverse possession claim.
12.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Introduction of Documents

and Testimony that Plaintiffs Paid the Taxes on the Provo Property From 1983-2000 is rendered
moot by the judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' adverse possession claim, and
13.

That Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Motions by Richard G. Allred is rendered moot

by the judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' adverse possession claim.

DATED this

K

day of

Cckfa^

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable AWhony W. Schofield
Fourth District Court
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